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THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GRAND JURY, et al 
Defendants-Respondents 
Case No. 14425 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On the 16th day of August 1975, the Salt Lake County Grand 
Jury , an investigative body, convened by the judges of the Th i rd Judic ia l 
D i s t r i c t Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, r e tu rned an 
indictment against the appellant F r ank Granato, which indictment was 
filed in the Dis t r i c t Court for Salt Lake County. On the 12th day of 
December 1975, the appellant filed an amended complaint in the Dis t r i c t 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, reques t ing the court to i s sue a 
wr i t of habeas corpus against the respondents upon the claim that the 
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indictment i ssued against him was a construct ive r e s t r a in t , in violation of 
due p r o c e s s and of the equal protect ion afforded him by the 5th and 14th 
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and by Art ic le 1, 
Sections 7, 12, 24 and 27 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Appellant 
based his claim upon the following al legat ions: 
1) That the indictment was i ssued without probable cause. 
2) That the appellant was denied a p re l imina ry hear ing . 
3) That the appellant was denied the r ight to take 
deposit ions before t r i a l . 
4) That the appellant was denied the names , add re s se s 
and telephone numbers of pe r sons interviewed by the grand 
jury, whether or not they would be called as wi tnesses in the 
prosecut ion of the case . 
5) That the appellant was denied the r ight to obtain a copy 
of the en t i re t r ansc r ip t of the tes t imony of al l wi tnesses who 
appeared before the grand jury. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court, the Honorable E r n e s t F. Baldwin, J r . , 
p res id ing , granted respondents ' motion to d i smiss appel lant ' s amended 
complaint by r ea son of the fact that the same failed to s ta te a claim upon 
which rel ief could be granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIS-
MISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD 
BE GRANTED. 
Respondents have no q u a r r e l with appel lant ' s posit ion that 
habeas corpus is civil in nature , and that the same is provided for by the 
Utah Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e . 
Rule 6b(f)(1) r e q u i r e s that the complaint for a wr i t of habeas 
corpus shal l ' 
" . . . s tate that the person designated i s legally 
r e s t r a i n e d of his l iber t ies by the defendant. . . " 
It is genera l ly acknowledged that custody by the person 
against whom a petition of habeas corpus i s d i rec ted mus t be such that 
he can produce the body of the pet i t ioner at a hear ing. See U. S. Ex. Rel. , 
Lynn v. Downer, 322 U. S. 756, 88 L. Ed. 1585. Likewise, it is general ly 
the ru le that a pe r son r e l e a s e d from custody on bail is not so r e s t r a i n e d 
of his l iber ty as to be entit led to a wr i t of habeas corpus . See Stallings v. 
Splain, 253 U.S . 339, 64 L. Ed. 940. See also annotation at 77 ALR. 2d 
1308. 
The purpose of the wr i t of habeas corpus i s to insure the 
speedy r e l e a s e of pe r sons legally r e s t r a i n e d of the i r l iber ty. It is not 
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intended as a means for appellant review. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Bryant v. Turner, 19 U. 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121, stated: 
"The writ is, as our rules describe it, an extra-
ordinary writ, to be used to protect one who is 
restrained of his liberty, where there exists no 
jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirements 
of the law have been so ignored or distorted that the 
party is substantially and effectively denied what is 
included in the term 'due process of law1. . . M 
The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed not to 
the question of e r ro r s committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to 
the question as to whether the proceedings or judgment under which 
petitioner is restrained, are void. Areson v. Pincock, 62 U 527, 220 P 
503. 
In view of the fact that the appellant Frank Granato is 
neither confined nor restrained, but is in fact free on his own recognizance, 
during the pendency of the matter before the trial court, there is no claim 
or basis upon which the trial court could issue against the grand jury and 
its members any kind of order requiring that they produce the petitioner, 
and release him. 
It is very apparent that the members of the grand jury are 
not holding the appellant and restraining his freedom, so that the tr ial 
court, when presented with the question of the petition in this matter, 
correctly ruled that there was no complaint upon which relief could be 
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granted at this time. It appears that the many challenges set forth in 
petitioner's complaint are challenges of the constitutionality of the basis 
upon which the appellant Granato stands before the court for trial. Under 
the ordinary situation, habeas corpus is not available in advance of trial, 
either to test the constitutionality of statutes, or to challenge the jur is-
dictional questions that may arise. Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 
59 L.Ed. 203; Rodman v. Pothier, 264 U. S. 399, 68 L. Ed. 759. 
Accordingly, it appears without question that the lower 
court did not e r r in dismissing appellant's complaint, and that the court 
was correct in ascertaining that the complaint, under the existing circum-
stances, does not state a claim for which the relief requested, to-wit: the 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, could be granted. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR VERBATIM COPIES OF TRANS-
CRIPTS OF GRAND JURY WITNESSES. 
The grand jury is, by creation, a special body given great 
investigatory powers by the statute creating it, and likewise placed under 
strict control by the same creating statutes. (Section 77-18, 19, 20, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953). The claim of the appellant that he is constitutionally 
entitled to the verbatim transcript of all witnesses who appeared before the 
grand jury relative to the indictment is a challenge to the secrecy concept 
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of the grand jury. Section 77-19-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended 1971, specifically requires as follows: 
" . . . No member of the grand jury, nor any person at 
any time present at any session of the grand jury, shall 
disclose what he himself or any other grand juror or 
person may have said at such session. No grand juror 
shall divulge in what manner he or any other grand juror 
may have voted on a matter before them; any grand 
juror or other person may, however, be required by 
the court to disclose the testimony of a witness 
examined before the grand jury, for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether it is consistent with that given 
by the witness before the court, or to disclose the 
testimony given before the grand jury by any person 
upon a charge against such person for perjury in 
giving his testimony, or upon his tr ial thereof. ,! 
Thus, disclosure by grand jurors of testimony is regulated 
by statute. The need for this secrecy is deep-rooted in the laws of the 
State of Utah, and was supported by the court in the early case of United 
States v. Kirkland (1887) 5 U 123, 13 P 234. 
The legislature, in anticipating the need to prescribe such 
secrecy in the grand jury proceedings in Section 77-19-9, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended 1971, specifically prohibited the making of 
more than two copies of the stenographer's transcript, and also prohibited 
the showing of the transcript to anyone except by court order. That section 
provides as follows: 
•
 lf
. . . Two copies only of any testimony required to be 
transcribed as in this section provided shall be made 
by the stenographic reporter. One such copy shall 
be delivered to the clerk of the district court of the 
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county in which the grand jury is in session and one 
copy thereof shall be delivered to the county attorney. . . 
No person to whom a transcript of the testimony has 
been delivered as herein provided shall exhibit said 
transcript to any person nor divulge the contents thereof 
to any person except upon written order of the court duly 
made after hearing the persons in whose custody said 
copy is placed; . ' . . " . 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Faux, 9 U. 2d 3 50, 
345 P. 2d 186, 190 (1959), that the permission for examination of the 
transcript is at the discretion of the court, stating: 
"The tr ial judge discreetly and properly circumscribed 
the procedure so that only material portions of the 
transcript of the testimony of witnesses would be 
exposed and then only to the extent he deemed the 
ends of justice required it. 
None of the statements, discussions, actions, or votes 
of the grand jurors are in any wise to be disclosed. 
The transcript is to be examined by only one person, 
defense counsel, who is an officer of the court, under 
strictly limited circumstances. The order included 
these restrictions: that the district attorney should 
"screen" the testimony of such witnesses and make 
available to defense counsel only portions relevant 
and material to the case; that the inspection should 
be made in the office of the district attorney; that 
defense counsel could make no copy but only take 
notes as to substance; and that the latter should not 
reveal to any other person any of the contents of said 
record except as it might become material for 
impeachment at the trial. No case has been cited, 
and we are aware of none, which holds that an order 
so carefully preserving secrecy of the grand jury 
proceedings is an abuse of discretion. 
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In the recent case of Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 395, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1323, 79 S, Ct. 1237 
(1959), the United States Supreme Court divided five 
to four on the question whether the trial court had 
abused its discretion in refusing the defendants 
permission to inspect grand jury minutes covering 
testimony of a key government witness. The govern-
ment had offered to let the tr ial judge screen the 
testimony and to allow inspection of material portions, 
which offer the defendant rejected. For the majority, 
Justice Clark reviewed the authorities and arguments 
for grand jury secrecy; for the minority Justice Brennan 
similarly covered the desirability of permitting full 
disclosure to the defense, and stated that the court had 
abused its discretion in refusing it. However, it will be 
noted that both opinions reflect that the question of 
disclosure res ts in the sound discretion of the tr ial 
court. To the same effect see the recent case of 
State ex rel . Clagett v. James, Mo. , 327 SW. 2d 278. 
Majority opinion by Hyde, J . , Eager, J , , dissented 
opinion denying rehearing, 327 SW. 2d 289. See 
annotations at 127 ALR 272 for collation of authorities 
pro and con as to secrecy of grand jury proceedings. If 
Another Utah case involving the same question is State v. 
Harries, 221 P. 2d 605, 615 (1950), in which Harries, former chief enforce-
ment officer of the Liquor Control Commission, was convicted for the crime 
of receiving a bribe, and appealed, claiming e r ror in seven points, one of 
which was denying to the accused the right to inspect and make a copy of 
the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses appearing before the grand 
jury. The court held that "the matter is left to the sound discretion of the 
t r ia l court and the burden to establish an abuse of that discretion. n State v. 
Harries goes on to say: 
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"It has always been the policy of the law that the 
investigations and deliberations of a grand jury 
should be behind closed doors and that the 
results of its labors should not be disclosed. " 
In the present case, appellant claims a constitutional right 
to have verbatim transcripts of all grand jury witnesses. The United States 
Supreme Court has declared that there is no such right. 
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra, the 
defendants, on a charge of conspiracy, requested that the tr ial judge 
permit them to inspect the grand jury minutes covering the testimony 
before that body of a key government witness at the trial . On certiorari , 
the defendants contended that they had a right to the transcript because it 
dealt with subject matter generally covered at the trial. The defendants 
did not show a particularized need for the disclosure of the grand jury 
minutes. The court held that "the short of it is the petitioners did not 
invoke the discretion of the tr ial judge but asserted a supposed absolute 
right, a right which we hold they did not have. " The Utah Supreme Court 
in Faux and Harries, supra, established a similar position by holding: 
"The defendant is not entitled to inspect a copy of the transcript before 
t r ia l as a matter of right. ,! 
The federal grand jury is similar to Utah in secrecy in other 
ways. Both courts allow the secrecy broken in the same manner. The 
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United States Supreme Court states that the policy of maintaining the 
secrecy of grand jury proceedings in the federal court must not be broken 
except when there is a compelling necessity shown with particularity. 
That particularity can be "to impeach a witness to refresh his recollection, 
to test his credibility and the like. Those are cases of particularized need 
where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discreetly and limitedly. " 
See United States v. Procter and Gamble Co. , et al, 356 U.S. 677, 2 L. Ed. 
1077, 78 S. Ct. 183 (1958). 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared that the use of the 
grand jury transcript is for impeachment purposes only, and that it is only 
because the legislature has provided for such limited use. (Section 77-19-9), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
State v. Harr ies , supra, states that: 
lf
. . . However, we cannot go further than permitted 
by the provisions of this chapter for the reason that 
the authority to relax is with the legislature and not 
the courts. The quoted sections establish that the 
legislature only intended to lessen the tension of 
the common law rules to the extent of making a 
transcript available to the defense for impeachment 
purposes. 
. . . ^Furthermore, the legislature very easily prescribed 
that a copy of the transcript be furnished the defendant, 
had it intended such to be the case . . . 
. . . The transcript was inspected by counsel for the 
defendant so the only question is: Was the permitted 
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inspection too late for the purposes contemplated 
by the statute? If use of the transcript is limited 
to impeachment purposes, then defendant could 
not make a claim of contradictory stories until 
a witness who had appeared before the grand jury 
had testified in the trial of the cause. If 
It has long been the practice to have secret grand jury 
sessions. In 1887, when Utah was still a terri tory, U. S. v. Kirkland, 
supra, stated that: 
"Every member of the grand jury must keep secret 
what is said or how he voted but may be required by 
any court to disclose the testimony of a witness 
examined before them for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether it is consistent with that given upon trial. . . n 
Section 77-19-10, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1947, 
states that none can disclose what grand jurors say, or how they voted, 
but may be required to disclose what witnesses said to show whether they 
are inconsistent at trial. 
U." S. Circuit Courts have also ruled that the testimony of 
witnesses before a grand jury is privileged and confidential. Goodman v. 
U. S. , 108 F. 2d 516 (Cal. 1939), states that, "It has long been the policy 
of the law, in furtherance of justice, that the investigations and delibera-
tions of a grand jury should be conducted in secret, and that for most 
intents and purposes, all its proceedings should legally be sealed against 
divulgence. ,f 
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The appellant cites a Nevada case to support his claims 
for a verbatim copy of a transcript of the grand jury. That case, 
Shelby v. South Judicial District Court in and for the County of 
Pershing, 414 P. 2d 942 (Nevada 1966) can be differentiated from 
the present facts. There, appellant desired only to inspect the 
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses, while here, appellant 
desires a verbatim copy. Moreover, in this case, counsel was, and 
is, permitted to inspect the transcript. 
Shelby can further be distinguished in that in Shelby 
no transcript was made, and in this case there was one made. This 
practice is due to the differing statutes in the State of Utah and the 
State of Nevada. Utah Section 77-19-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended 1971, not only requires that a transcript be made, but also 
requires that the transcript must be secret. Nevada NRS 172, 173, 
does not specifically allow that a copy of the transcript be made for 
review by the defendant, nor does it even infer that a transcript be made 
at all. 
The refusal of the lower court to permit verbatim copies 
of transcripts to be made available to appellant is well founded in law 
and necessity, and did not constitute e r ror by that court. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE 
APPELLANT A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
DID NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE STATE OF UTAH. 
His tor ica l ly , the grand jury has been the pr incipal buffer 
between the individual and the power of the s ta te to prosecute for c r ime . 
The grand jury was developed as a means of avoiding abuses in ea r ly 
England, where the use of p r e l imina ry hear ings was pa r t of the 
c r imina l invest igat ive p rocedure . That the grand jury, and not the 
p r e l i m i n a r y hear ing, was made a pa r t of the United States Constitution, 
indicates the impor tance assoc ia ted ea r ly to that body. 
The question of grand jury indictment v e r s u s p re l imina ry 
hear ings has often been cons idered by the cour ts , and despite the 
defense c r i e s of prosecut ional "orientation1 ] of the grand jury, the 
cour t s have consis tent ly held that an indictment by a grand jury itself 
e s tab l i shes sufficient probable cause to hold an accused for t r i a l , 
so that post - indic tment p r e l imina ry hear ings to review probable cause 
i s not war ran ted . See Coleman v. Burnett , 477 F . 2d 1187; U. S. v. 
Roge r s , 455 F . 2d 407; Costello v. U . S . , 350 U.S . 359; Robbins 
v. U. S. , 486 F . 2d 26; U. S. v. Mackey, 474 F . 2d 55; U. S. v. 
Dorsey , 462 F. 2d 361. 
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Appellant claims that any accused has the fundamental 
right to a preliminary hearing before trial, and cites Johnson v. 
Superior Court of San Joaquin Co., 539 P. 2d 792 (Cal. 1975), to 
support his claim. This case is distinguishable and inappropriate to 
the instant case. There, a preliminary hearing was held before the 
grand jury acted. The court held that it was improper for the prosecutor 
to withhold from the grand jury testimony produced at the preliminary 
hearing. In the instant case, the appellant seeks an additional procedural 
step, a preliminary hearing after indictment, which in effect would 
render the grand jury function powerless. 
The California Supreme Court in Johnson, supra, specific-
ally refused to consider whether the lack of a past indictment preliminary 
hearing violated due process. The court stated: 
"Having disposed of this case on statutory grounds 
(interpretation of California penal code 83. 97), we 
need not consider petitioner's alternative due 
process argument. fl 
The concurring opinion of Judge Mosk agreed with the result, 
but disagreed on entertaining the due process argument. The appellant 
quoted Judge Mosk!s disagreeing discussion of due process. Thus, the 
appellant's quote is merely dicta, not even binding in California. 
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Appellant further relies upon the case of People v. Duncan, 
201 NW. 2d 629, 388 Mich. 489 (1972), in which a preliminary examination 
before or after an indictment was held to be required by a Michigan 
statute, which reads: 
"The state and the accused shall be entitled to a 
prompt examination and determination by the 
examining magistrate in all criminal cases . . . " 
1 of Chapter VI of 1927 P. A. 175. 
Since Utah does not have a similar statute, the application 
of this holding is without value. This is particularly true, since the court 
in Duncan also said at page 633: 
"The conclusion is inescapable that in the absence 
of a clear statutory provision for a preliminary 
examination following presentment of an indictment 
by a grand jury, then there never has been such a 
r i g h t " 
Appellant further claims that Article I, Section 13, of the 
Utah Constitution gives the right to preliminary hearing. This section of 
the Constitution states: 
"Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information 
after examination and commitment by a magistrate, 
unless the examination be waived by the accused 
with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with 
or without such examination and commitment. The 
formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
(As amended November 2, 1948, effective January 1, 
1959). " (Emphasis added). 
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The last sentence was added as a 1949 amendment, giving 
legislature power to prescribe how to proceed in prosecutions by 
indictment. 
An additional supportive aspect of the grand jury, indict-
ment is based upon the fact that the standard for finding a reason to bind 
over a defendant after a preliminary examination is less for preliminary 
hearings than it is for a grand jury to return an indictment. 
Section 77-19-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
1943, states that the grand jury ought to find an indictment when all 
of the evidence before them, taken together, if unexplained or uncontra-
dicted, would, in their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury. 
Section 77-20-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 1943, states 
that 5 out of 7 jurors must concur for an indictment. The standard for 
the preliminary examination is stated in Section 77-15-19, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended 1943. "If it appears from the examination 
that a public offense has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause 
to believe the defendant guilty thereof. n Marhs v. Sulhvan, 9 U 12, 
16 33 P 224 (893), states that it is sufficient that the testimony shows to 
the satisfaction of the magistrate a probable cause of guilt on the part of • 
the accused. 
If the standard is lower for finding a reason to bind over a 
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defendant after preliminary examination than it is for a grand jury, then 
what additional protection benefit would the defendant receive by submitting 
his case to the lower standard of the preliminary examination? 
That a preliminary examination is not indispensable for a 
t r ia l after an indictment has long been the practice in Utah. In the case 
of Thiede v. Terr i tory of Utah, 159 U.S. 510, 513, 40 L. Ed. 237, 
239-240 (1895), Thiede was held for murder, and the tr ial court convicted 
him. On appeal, one of the points of e r ror was that the stenographer 
refused to transcribe his shorthand of the preliminary hearing because 
he feared lack of payment due to previous cases. Since the time within 
which this was, by statute, required to be done had already passed, the 
objection to tr ial without a transcript would have been fatal to the 
indictment, or delayed the tr ial unreasonably. The court held: 
"Before a ruling is made which necessarily works 
out such a result, it should appear either that the 
statute gives an absolute right to the defendant to 
insist upon this preliminary filing, or else that the 
want of it would cause material injury to his defense. 
Neither can be affirmed. A preliminary examination 
is not indispensable to the finding of an indictment or 
a t r ial thereon; and if the examination itself is not 
indispensable, it would seem to follow that no steps 
can be taken in the course or as a part of it can be. fl 
Therefore, the denial of an additional preliminary hearing 
was not e r ror by the lower court. 
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POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE 
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS, 
AS REQUESTED, DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Appellant made application to the tr ial court to take the 
depositions of all persons necessary for adequate preparation of his 
defense. This included all witnesses who appeared before the grand jury. 
This, of course, is but another attempt to circumvent the secrecy of the 
grand jury. 
To support his position, appellant cites the case of State v. 
Geurts, 11 U. 2d 345, 359 P. 2d 12, claiming that the Utah Supreme Court 
held it to be e r ror for an accused charged by indictment to be denied the 
right to take depositions before trial. In the Geurts case, the defendant 
was indicted by a grand jury while serving a term as Commissioner of 
Salt Lake City. Thereafter, proceedings under Chapter 7, Title 77, 
UCA 1953, to remove defendant from office, were commenced. A jury 
found him guilty of malfeasance in office, and a judgment was entered 
removing him from office. On appeal, appellant Geurts claimed as er ror 
the tr ial court 's ruling denying his request to take depositions. The Supreme 
Court ruled that the proceeding was a quasi-criminal special statutory 
proceeding which, under the applicable statute, did not permit a 
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preliminary hearing, and that therefore it was subject to the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, including the right to take depositions. The court 
said: 
"This proceeding can be nothing other than a 
special statutory proceeding, and we can see 
no reason why such rules are 'clearly 
inapplicable1 thereto. Therefore, we conclude 
that under usual circumstances the taking of 
depositions should be permissible. " 
This decision does not alter the statutory provisions of the 
State of Utah pertaining to depositions in criminal matters , which pro-
visions were upheld by this court in State v. Nielsen, Utah 1974, 522 P. 2d 
1366. There, the defendant claimed the right in a criminal matter to take 
depositions under Rule 81(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides: 
"Application in Criminal Proceedings. These 
rules of procedure shall also govern in any 
aspect of criminal proceedings where there is 
no other applicable statute or rule, provided 
that any rule so applied does not conflict with 
any statutory or constitutional requirement. ,! 
The court found that the taking of depositions in criminal 
mat ters is governed by two statutes, Sections 77-46-1 and 77-46-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, and that the provisions of Rule 81(e) were not 
applicable, and that the Rules of Civil Procedure "pertaining to discovery 
may not be used in criminal cases. f! The court stated: 
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"The majority rule is to the effect that neither 
statues nor rules of civil procedure providing 
for discovery or inspection of evidence in the 
premises of an adverse party will be made 
applicable in criminal cases. ff 
"We are of the opinion that until such time as 
the statutes above referred to are modified or 
repealed by the legislature, this court would be 
without power to provide for discovery proceedings 
by court rule. " 
It is not as though the appellant is without the information 
he seeks, since the transcript of testimony before the grand jury is 
available for counsel's inspection and review. To allow depositions to be 
taken of anyone who defense counsel considers necessary for adequate 
preparation would allow a total destruction of the grand jury system. 
In asking this court to overrule the Nielsen case, supra, 
the appellant is asking the court to revamp an area of the criminal law 
that would have far-reaching effects, particularly as the same may pertain 
to the future conduct of the grand jury system. If the deposition power 
requested by appellant is granted, then no witnesses can appear before a 
grand jury without fear that they will be subject to deposition by any one 
indicted by such grand jury. Thus, the greatest power of the grand jury 
system, that of secrecy, would be rendered useless. 
Likewise, should the deposition power be granted to the 
appellant, and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure made effective in 
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criminal cases, would appellant be subject to deposition by the prosecu-
tion in its discovery efforts in tr ial preparation? 
It is respectfully submitted that the Nielsen case be upheld 
and that the order of the lower court denying the taking of depositions be 
sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
While appellant has presented many questions to be con-
sidered by this court, the main question is the right of appellant to have 
a writ of habeas corpus issued. As previously indicated, there is no 
present basis upon which the t r ial court could issue such writ, and its 
denial of appellant's application was proper and should be sustained. 
Appellant would have the court conclude that the preliminary 
hearing has a Special magic within the framework of due process and 
equal protection. It is submitted that in preserving the grand jury sustem, 
the creators of the Constitution of the United States, and the draftees of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah found justifiable cause to believe that such 
system would, in fact, afford due process and equal protection. The 
appellant has adequate protection under the present status of the law. 
His challenge of the grand jury system is a request to alter completely the 
criminal procedures long established by statute and case decision in this 
state. 
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The lower court acted correctly and followed both statutory 
and case law in denying appellant's request for habeas corpus, and in 
denying appellant's complaint of denial of due process and equal protection. 
It is respectfully submitted that the ruling of the lower court 
be sustained and that the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant 
be determined by the time honored method of jury determination. To 
reverse the lower court would be tantamount to the total elimination of the 
grand jury system. We ask only that the rights of the State be given the 
same consideration as those of the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER R. ELLETT and 
STEPHEN H. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
By 
Walter R. Ellett 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Respondents was served upon 
Phil L. Hansen and Associates, and D. Frank Wilkins, Counsel for 
Appellants, 250 East Broadway - Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
and upon R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake County Attorney, C-220 Metropolitan 
Hall of Justice, 251 East 5th South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of July 1976. 
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